University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Civil Engineering Theses, Dissertations, and
Student Research

Civil Engineering

12-2014

GIS-Based Route Risk Assessment of Hazardous
Material Transport
Myungwoo Lee
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, myungwoo@huskers.unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/civilengdiss
Part of the Civil Engineering Commons
Lee, Myungwoo, "GIS-Based Route Risk Assessment of Hazardous Material Transport" (2014). Civil Engineering Theses, Dissertations,
and Student Research. 74.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/civilengdiss/74

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Civil Engineering at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Civil Engineering Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

GIS-Based Route Risk Assessment of Hazardous
Material Transport

by

Myungwoo Lee

A THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science

Major: Civil Engineering

Under the Supervision of Professor Aemal Khattak

Lincoln, Nebraska
December, 2014

GIS-Based Route Risk Assessment of Hazardous
Material Transport

Myungwoo Lee, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2014

Adviser: Aemal Khattak
The transportation of hazardous materials keeps increasing across the United States
due to the growing consumption of goods and rising need for manufactured materials.
Furthermore, concerns are mounting over the safe surface transportation of hazardous
materials. Highways and rails are the most common modes of transport for hazardous
materials, although the risk posed from highway transport of hazardous materials may be
higher due to the fact that highways are public while rails are mostly private. The
majority of hazardous material cargo is carried on the highway network by trucks. Due to
possible adverse effects on human and animal populations in the event of an accident
involving hazardous materials, there is a need for the development of a highway route
risk assessment tool that precisely represents transportation risks associated with
hazardous cargos and to build a framework for designating a set of risky routes based on
different factors.
The research presented in this thesis explains a methodology to analyze the spatial
patterns of truck accident data, discern potentially risky routes of truck traffic carrying

hazardous materials, and estimate the impact area of an identified risky route by
quantifying the human population affected in that area. Lancaster County in Nebraska
was used as the study area and the hazardous material exposure from a theoretical truckinvolved accident was estimated. It was concluded that the developed procedures
successfully identified vulnerable areas in terms of hazardous material transport and
estimated the affected areas and human population.
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1

1.1

INTRODUCTION

Background
Hazardous materials (hazmats) are substances that can adversely affect human health

and the environment. They are classified as explosives, flammables, oxidizing substances,
poisonous gases or radioactive materials (United Nations, 2001). However, in a broad
sense, hazmats can be substances whose physical or chemical traits can harm living
organisms including humans (ABAG, 1990). A modern society ceaselessly requires and
generates hazmats, which require safe handling and transport. Thus, safe treatment of
hazmats has been a serious concern of society.
According to the US Department of Transportation (USDOT), more than half of the
total hazmat tonnage (53.9%) was carried by trucks on the highways (US DOT, 2010).
The release of hazmat from a roadway accident is a serious threat to those in the vicinity
of the accident location. As circumstances require, evacuation plans may be implemented
at the affected areas. Therefore, it is important to identify areas that may be vulnerable in
terms of hazmat accidents.
Identification of highways that may be susceptible to hazmat crashes is an important
first step toward more informed planning for hazmat accidents. This research focused on
developing procedures and a tool for identification of vulnerable highway segments and
surrounding areas with respect to hazmat incidents. Identification of susceptible
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highways and surrounding areas can help policymakers, engineers, and stakeholders with
more informed decision-making and better planning for dealing with hazmat accidents.
This research utilized several publically-available datasets and GIS-based data
integration techniques. The basic premise was that each input datum had intrinsic
characteristics that represented suitable or unsuitable degrees for the research purpose
(Murphy, 2005). Diverse input datasets (roadway networks, wind information, hazmat
facilities, fire stations, medical facilities, schools, and population data) were obtained
from public sources. In addition, four years of traffic accident data were obtained from
the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) to identify accident-prone highway
segments for truck traffic. Spatial analytical concepts were utilized to discern patterns
among truck accidents. The spatial analysis revealed useful accident point patterns which
were then used in the integration of all the datasets. Combining all the datasets together
allowed identification of highway segments satisfying multiple selection criteria. That is,
the most vulnerable highway segments in terms of all the hazmat risk-related criteria
were identified. The hazmat modeling tool was used to portray release pattern in the air.
This provided a general view of hazmat dispersion patterns and the affected areas by the
dispersion shapes.
This thesis presents a concise description of the specific issues investigated in this
research in a problem statement section. The sections after the problem statement include
the research area selection, research objectives, research organization, data collection,
data analysis, and conclusions.
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1.2

Problem Statement
A significant amount of hazmat flows through Nebraska using the highway system

and presents varying levels of hazmat exposure to areas along the highways. Currently,
there is no assessment of the risk associated with the flow of hazmat on different
Nebraska highway segments, including estimation of vulnerable populations in case of
hazmat accidents on highways. Also, research techniques using multiple criteria in
conjunction with statistical approaches using historical accident data have not been fully
utilized. Thus, an investigation of the development of a geographic information system
(GIS) based tool for assessment of risk on different Nebraska highway segments utilizing
multi-criteria analysis that takes into consideration historical truck accident data is
warranted.

1.3

Research Area Selection
To develop and test a GIS-based risk assessment tool for identification of hazmat risk

on different Nebraska highway segments, areas with high truck traffic were selected. An
estimate of the annual vehicle miles traveled by trucks (AVMTT) in Nebraska was
considered an indicator for research area selection. AVMTT can be calculated by
multiplying the distance by the Average Annual Daily Truck Traffic (AADTT). AADTT
was computed using the American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO) method. This method has three steps:
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1) Average monthly days of the week (MADW) are computed. There are 84 values
(12 months by 7 days).
2) The values are then averaged to yield the seven average annual days of the week
(AADW).
3) These seven values (AADW) are then averaged to yield the AADT.
To derive the statewide AVMTT for only hazmat trucks, the portion of hazmat trucks
in the traffic stream was required and obtained using the steps below.
1) The State of Nebraska was divided into 8 sections.
2) Each section had four truck traffic observation sites and 12-hour observations
were collected at each site to count non-hazmat as well as hazmat trucks by
hazmat classifications.
3) Roadways where the observation sites were located were categorized by different
road groups.
4) NDOR adjustment factors for each road group were applied to convert 12-hour
truck traffic data into annual average daily truck traffic and annual average daily
hazmat truck traffic counts.
Lancaster County in Nebraska was selected as the research area because it had one of
the highest numbers of AVMTT for hazmat trucks, and the second highest number of
total AVMT. While Lincoln and Dawson Counties had higher AVMTT for hazmat trucks
(Table 1), these two counties had lower numbers for total AVMT. Thus, it was
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appropriate to choose Lancaster County as the research area for analysis. Table 1 shows
the top ten AVMTT for hazmat trucks in Nebraska.
Table 1: Top 10 AVMTT for hazmat trucks in Nebraska

1.4

Rank

County

2010 Hazmat Truck AVMTT
(millions)

2010 Total AVMT
(millions)

1

Lincoln

8.56177

587.069

2

Dawson

6.889472

420.179

3

Lancaster

4.967357

2361.797

4

Douglas

4.760417

4432.422

5

Buffalo

6.000548

592.996

6

Keith

3.351206

305.761

7

Hall

4.722522

622.849

8

Seward

3.371577

377.335

9

York

3.341434

350.771

10

Hamilton

3.998482

291.613

Research Objectives
The research objective was to develop a GIS-based multi-criteria tool for

identification of risk-prone highway segments for hazmat-involved highway accidents.
Due to limitation of resources, consideration of all roadways in Nebraska for potential
hazmat vehicle accidents was not practical and therefore, only major highway segments
in Lancaster County were taken into consideration. Additionally, this research focused on
identifying affected areas and resident populations that may potentially be affected by
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released hazmat from a highway accident. According to chemical concentration levels
from the source point, different boundaries lines were set. These lines could be used for
evacuation plans in case of a hazmat release accident. Unlike using a circular boundary
line, the research introduced a modeling tool for hazmat release patterns to portray the
footprints of hazmat dispersion more accurately.

1.5

Research Plan
The research plan consisted of four main tasks, which are explained in each chapter

of the thesis. A brief summary of each task is presented in sections 1.5.1-1.5.4.

1.5.1

Task 1: Literature Review

A literature review was conducted to provide current trends and statistics on hazmat
transportation and accidents. This review task identified a general description of hazmat,
shipments, number of hazmat-related accidents, hazmat transportation risk, impact area
modeling, and multi-criteria analysis for hazmat transportation. The literature review
section provides related research with respect to hazmat transportation, related problems,
identifies the limit of current studies, and justifies this research.

1.5.2

Task 2: Data Collection

Several datasets were retrieved from diverse sources for multi-criteria analysis. Most
data were obtained from official government websites free of cost. The collected data
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included roadway network data; wind information; locations of hazmat facilities, fire
stations, medical facilities and schools; four year period vehicle accident data; and
population data in Lancaster County. Nebraska truck accident data were obtained from
NDOR. Chapter 3 presents data collection details.

1.5.3

Task 3: Data Analysis

As part of this research three data analyses were conducted in GIS: a truck accident
data analysis, a multi-criteria analysis, and an impact assessment analysis. The historical
accident data were analyzed to be utilized in the multi-criteria analysis. Microsoft Excel
software was used to extract truck-involved accidents from the accident data. Next,
different criteria or layers were posed in a GIS platform for integration. The cell-based
raster analytical concept was used to meet the different criteria. Finally, an impact
assessment analysis was implemented to quantify the impact areas and population.

1.5.4

Task 4: Conclusions

This task consisted of drawing conclusions based on the results of each analysis and
discusses the implications. Also, future research topics related to the studies in this thesis
are presented.
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1.6. Thesis Organization
Following this chapter is a chapter on literature review that presents published
literature relevant to this research, including a general description of hazardous materials,
hazmat shipments, hazmat transportation accidents, hazmat transportation risk, impact
area modeling, and multi-criteria analysis for hazmats.
Chapter 3 presents data collection details such as where and how the data were
collected, including explanations of each datum and their relevance to the research
objectives. Chapter 4 presents the data analysis in which some of data were utilized
directly while others, such as truck accident data, were analyzed with spatial analytical
techniques to create more meaningful datasets. There are three main analysis parts in this
chapter. They include truck accident data analysis, multi-criteria analysis, and impact
analysis. A truck accident data analysis was conducted to create an accident density raster
map, which was one of the inputs to multi-criteria analysis. In the multi-criteria analysis,
all the inputs collected from different sources and the results of an accident data analysis
were integrated to determine areas where all the criteria were met. The impact analysis
showed the procedure to get both visual illustrations of impact and the quantification of
the impact area.
Chapter 5 presents the research conclusions that are based on information gained
from the data analysis section. The chapter also includes information on the limitations
and challenges of this research to adduce future directions of related studies.
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2

2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

General Descriptions of Hazardous Materials
The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) defined a hazardous material

(hazmat) as “a harmful substance that can cause injury, death or serious illness, or put a
substantial threat to the human population or the environment due to its chemical,
physical or infectious attributes” (ABAG, 1990). The United Nations (2001) classified
hazardous materials into nine different hazmat classes, using their physical, chemical, and
nuclear properties. They were: explosives and pyrotechnics; gasses; flammable and
combustible liquids; flammable, combustible, and dangerous-when-wet solids; oxidizers
and organic peroxides; poisonous and infectious materials; radioactive materials;
corrosive materials (acidic or basic); and miscellaneous dangerous goods, such as
hazardous wastes. The USDOT used the same classifications for their Commodity Flow
Survey (CFS). Table 2 shows the classification used for the survey. However, as defined
by ABAG, hazmat can be any substance whose physical or chemical traits can harm
living organisms, including humans. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA) and the California Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC) have been
updating the list of classifications.
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Table 2 USDOT Hazardous Material Classes
Class

2.2

Properties of Hazardous Materials

1

Explosives

2

Gases

3

Flammable and combustible liquids

4

Flammable solids

5

Oxidizers and Organic Peroxides

6

Toxic (Poisonous) Materials and Infectious Substances

7

Radioactive Materials

8

Corrosive Materials

9

Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods

Hazardous Material Shipments
There were approximately 500,000 daily hazmat shipments reported in the US

(Dungun, 1991). The Office of Hazardous Materials Safety (OHMS, 1998), or the
affiliated organization Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), which was created within the USDOT in 2004, estimates that there were more
than 800,000 hazmat shipments per day in the US. According to OHMS, about 43% of
total hazmat tonnage is transported by truck and approximately 94% of the total number
of hazmat shipments were made by trucks while air, rail, and water transportation
accounted for 5.3%, 0.53%, and 0.04% respectively (OHMS, 1998). Pipelines accounted
for only 0.11% of the total hazmat trips.
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Dependence on trucks for hazmat transportation increased in 2002 and 2007
compared to 1998 in terms of the percentage of tons shipped. A Commodity Flow Survey
(CFS) conducted by USDOT revealed that 52.9% and 53.9% of total hazmat tonnage was
carried by trucks, followed by pipelines (30.2% and 28.2%) in 2002 and 2007
respectively shown in Table 3 (USDOT, 2010). Even though the percentage changed
within narrow limits between 2002 and 2007, large amounts of hazardous materials were
mainly transported by trucks using the highway system.
Table 3 Hazardous Material Shipment Characteristics by Mode of Transportation:
2007 and 2002
Source: USDOT, 2010

Mode of
transportation

Tons
(thousands)

Percentage of Tons

2007

2002

1,202,825

1,159,514

53.9%

52.9%

Rail

129,743

109,369

5.8%

5.0%

Water

149,794

228,197

6.7%

10.4%

Pipeline

628,905

661,390

28.2%

30.2%

Multiple modes

111,022

18,745

5.0%

0.9%

8,844

14,304

0.4%

0.6%

2,231,133

2,191,519

100.0%

100.0%

Truck

Other and unknown
modes
Total

2007

2002
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2.3

Hazardous Material Transportation Accidents
Erkut et al. (2007) argued that even though a hazmat incident was a rare event, the

potential consequences of such an incident were high. The USDOT (2013) reported that
there were 15,774 incidents involving hazmat transportation in 2013, of which 26.5%
were during the transit phase and it was noticeable that damages in the transit phase
accounted for 94.6% of the total damages in 2013. That is, en-route damage was the
largest portion, representing $67.06 million. Table 4 shows the 2013 hazmat incident
summary by transportation phase.
Table 4: U.S. Hazmat Incident Summary by Transportation Phase in 2013
Source: PHMSA, 2014
Total
Incidents

Total number
of
Hospitalized
Persons

4,184

11

37

483

8

0

0

$ 562,306

Loading

3,350

3

22

1

$ 2,836,118

Unloading

7,757

5

68

0

$ 454,873

Total

15,774

27

127

Transportation
Phase
In transit
In transit storage

Total number of
NonTotal
Hospitalized
Fatalities
Persons

Total
Damages

9 $ 67,056,517

10 $ 70,909,814

PHMSA also provided hazmat accident information from the Incident Reports
Database. The database contained all reported hazmat-related accidents since 2000, when
such record-keeping started. Since 2000, there were 246,814 hazmat accidents. Figure 1
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shows the hazmat accident classification from 2000 to 2014. It is noticeable that
flammable-combustible liquids and corrosive materials accounted for the major portion
of hazmat accidents during the period.

Miscellaneous
4%
Oxidizers
Toxic materials
4%

Others
2%

4%

Gases
6%

Corrosive
materials
29%

Flammable and
combustible
liquids
51%

Figure 1 Hazmat Accidents by Class (PHMSA, 2014)
Source: https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/

2.4

Hazmat Transportation Risk
Hazmat transportation risk is distinguishable from normal transportation accident risk

since it may cause serious consequences to surrounding communities. Erukt et al. (2007)
maintained that the main factor that distinguished hazmat transportation issues from other
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transportation problems was the risk. List et al. (1991) used the following equation to
calculate the total risk from hazmat movement on a highway link:
𝑅𝑙 = 𝑆𝑙 × 𝑃𝑙 × 𝑁𝑙
Where,
𝑅𝑙 = the total risk from hazmat movement on link 𝑙,
𝑆𝑙 = the number of shipments on link 𝑙,
𝑃𝑙 = the probability of a hazmat release accident for a single shipment on link 𝑙, and
𝑁𝑙 = the total number of persons who will be affected by a release accident on link 𝑙.
Alp (1995) defined hazmat transportation risk as the measure of the probability and
severity of damages to exposed receptors with respect to the hazmat-related
transportation accidents. The exposed receptor could be anything such as a person, the
environment, or properties near an accident spot (Erukt et al., 2007). That is, anything
whose ability or function can be deteriorated by hazmat transportation release accidents
was considered for calculation of hazmat transportation risk. In terms of consequences,
Erukt el al. (2007) classified four different categories: human-related effects, including
death, injury, or long-term effects of the hazmat exposure; property damages;
environmental effects, including animals and plants; and socio-economic losses due to
evacuation and blockage of affected roadway segments.
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2.5

Impact Area Modeling
There is significant literature that discusses modeling of impact areas by hazardous

materials. Erkut et al. (2007) explained that the negative consequences in terms of hazmat
transportation accidents are a function of the impact area and the affected population,
property, and environmental resources. They maintained that the shape and the size of the
hazmat impact area can be determined by hazmat types, topology, weather, and wind
direction and speed.
To estimate the impact area, different shapes and methods were used. Batta and Chiu
(1988) and ReVelle et al. (1991) suggest a method to estimate the affected area by
drawing a band of fixed width around each link and using the number of persons living
within this band as the link consequence. For their approach, there was an assumption
that all people living within the band would experience the same impact from the
accident and people outside of the band would not be impacted. Erkut and Verter (1998)
and Kara et al. (2003) used a “danger circle” centered on the hazmat accident point and
calculated the affected areas within the “danger circle.” The radius of the circle was
determined by the type of hazmat. Rectangles were also considered to model hazmat
transportation impact area (ALK Associates, 1994). The “danger circle” or the
rectangular model did not consider wind direction, resulting in a constant distance from
the accident points. To model the impact of wind, the Gaussian plume model (GPM) was
popularly utilized for impact areas due to its reliable reflection of airborne hazmat
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accidents (Patel and Horowitz, 1994; Chakraborty and Armstrong, 1995; Zhang et al.,
2000). Figure 2 shows the shape of each described model.

Figure 2 Impact Area Modeling Types around the Route Segments

To model an airborne hazmat such as chlorine and ammonia, many researchers opted
for GPM (Hanna et al., 1993; Patel and Horowitz, 1994; Chang et al., 1997; Zhang et al.,
2000; Puliafito et al., 2003). The basic equation for GPM is:

𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) =

𝑄
−𝑦 2
−(𝑧 − ℎ)2
−(𝑧 + ℎ)2
exp ( 2 ) {exp (
)
+
exp
(
)}
2𝜋𝑢𝜎𝑦 𝜎𝑧
2𝜎𝑦
2𝜎𝑧2
2𝜎𝑧2

Where:
𝐶 =the concentration of the emission,
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Q = the quantity of the emission,
u = the wind speed,
h = the height of the source above ground level,
𝜎𝑦 and 𝜎𝑧 = the standard deviations of a statistically normal plume in the lateral and
vertical dimensions.
The model considers dispersion in all three dimensions (x, y and z), but Erkut et al.
(2006) maintained that the model could be simplified for hazmat dispersion from traffic
accidents. Since the source of hazmat is on the ground, the z value, or the height of the
source, is zero. This creates a new simplified equation as follows:

𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) = 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦) =

𝑄
−𝑦 2
exp ( 2 )
𝜋𝑢𝜎𝑦 𝜎𝑧
2𝜎𝑦

Erukt et al. (2007) pointed out several assumptions under the Gaussian Plume model:
(1) The traits of airborne contaminants were kept during dispersion,
(2) The topology was assumed flat,
(3) The released gas was carried only by the air, and not absorbed by soil or plants,
(4) The wind was blowing at a constant speed and in the same direction, and
(5) The spillage rate was constant.
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The authors indicated that these limiting assumptions might make the model
impractical, resulting in inaccurate results. For example, if a hazmat release accident
occurred in a geographically hilly area, the real release pattern of hazmat will be different
from the created plume model.

2.6

Multi-criteria Analysis for Hazmat Transportation
Multiple-criteria analysis (MCA) originates from operations research, which

considers diverse criteria to determine the optimal decision. MCA has been popular for
making more informed decisions. MCA can be a useful approach for a hazmat
transportation routing analysis since many different factors affect the risk of a hazmat
release accident on highways. By considering different criteria together, it is possible to
identify high-risk hazmat transportation routes.
Lepofsky and Abkowitz (1993) conducted multi-criteria analysis, calculating the
impact of hazmat transportation. They discussed possible Geographic Information
Systems for Transportation (GIST) techniques for analysis of hazmat transportation and
hazmat incident management by using different routing criteria such as distance, travel
time, population exposure, and so on. They applied the techniques in several case studies
in California to demonstrate the feasibility of the technique, and indicated the importance
of weights on different criteria, since using different weights often give different results.
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Panwhar et al. (2000) presented a multi-criteria risk assessment system for hazmat
transportation based on a GIS. They developed the system to determine the optimized
route that minimizes hazmat transportation risk. In the system, the optimized route did
not necessarily have the best score for all the criteria because the route with the best
averaged score was chosen.
Leonelli et al. (2000) considered MCA routing models to select less dangerous routes
for hazmat transportation. In the research, they analyzed an optimization problem
between vehicle operating costs and risk-related costs. If routes were selected to
minimize hazmat accident risks only, the significantly longer routes that avoid all the
vulnerable areas could be determined as the best hazmat transportation routing model.
They argued that these senselessly long routes were feasible without taking into account
appropriate vehicle operating costs. This indicated that multiple criteria were required for
analysis. They also explained that diverse weights could be added based on various
objectives and that the weights should mirror the relative importance of each criterion.
Van Raemdonck et al. (2013) argued that an allocation of weights to criteria approach
causes a problem of subjective weight assignment that may produce varying results. In
addition, Clark and Besterfield-Sacre (2009) maintained that previous studies using the
multi-criteria analysis did not pay much attention to the statistical methods in which
historical accident data are dealt. Abkowitz and Cheng (1988) also conclude that results
may be more accurate if more quantitatively collected historical data were used in
analyses.
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3

DATA COLLECTION

Eight possible different datasets of Lancaster County with respect to hazardous
material transportation were used in the analysis. These were the roadway network, wind
speed map, location information of fire stations, medical facilities, school locations,
hazmat facilities, 2008 to 2011 accident data, and 2010 population data for Lancaster
County. Each dataset is explained in detail in sections 3.1 to 3.6.

3.1

Roadway Network in Lancaster County
The roadway network information was essential to identification of risky hazmat

transportation routes. The National Highway Planning Network (NHPN) version 11.09
for Nebraska was used in this research. It is a 1:100,000 scale geospatial network
database, and contains information on the National Highway System (NHS). The network
system includes all principal arterials and rural minor arterials with respect to highway
functional classes. Since the risk of major truck traffic carrying hazmat is higher on those
high mobility-oriented roads, the arterials with different Annual Average Daily Traffic
(AADT) in Lancaster County were classified and analyzed for different levels of risk.
Figure 3 shows the arterials with different classes of AADT.
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Figure 3 Three Different AADT Groups in Lancaster County

3.2

Wind Information
Wind speed and direction are an important consideration in the analysis of diffusion

patterns of hazmat releases. If an area has higher wind speed, the risks of any hazmat
released may be more significant since the rapid spread enlarges affected areas, on the
other hand greater wind speed may help with the dispersal of any hazmat substance. The
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US Department of Energy provides information on regional wind. Table 5 shows the
classification and corresponding speeds at the elevation of 164.04 feet (50 meters).
Table 5: Wind Power Class

Wind power class

Resource
potential

Wind speed at 50 m
elevation (m/s)

Wind speed at 164.04 ft
elevation (ft/s)

1

Poor

0.0 - 5.7

0.0 – 18.7

2

Marginal

5.8 - 6.5

18.8 – 21.3

3

Fair

6.6 - 7.2

21.4 – 23.6

4

Good

7.3 - 7.8

23.7 – 25.6

5

Excellent

7.9 - 8.2

25.7 – 26.9

6

Outstanding

8.3 - 9.0

27.0 – 29.5

7

Superb

> 9.1

> 29.6

Lancaster County only has four wind classes, which are shown in Figure 4. The
prevailing wind speeds in Lancaster County range from 18.7 ft/s to 25.6 ft/s. It is notable
that some regions in the south part of Lancaster County have relatively high wind speeds,
which implies that any hazmat release may spread quickly. However, the areas showing
strong wind have lower population density. Most of the areas in Lancaster County belong
to category 2 Marginal (18.8 – 21.3 ft/s) and 3 Fair (21.4 – 23.6 ft/s) wind speeds.
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Figure 4 Wind Classes in Lancaster County

3.3

Hazmat Facilities in Lancaster County
The location of major hazmat facilities is an important factor to consider as hazmat

accidents could occur at these facilities during loading and unloading. The US EPA has
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, which provides information on the hazmat
facility names, addresses, coordinates, chemical types, and quantities, etc. The 2010 data
for Nebraska were downloaded from the inventory and used to locate hazmat facilities in
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Lancaster County. The total 21 hazmat facilities in Lancaster County were geocoded
using the coordinates of each facility. The detailed TRI geocoding information for
hazmat facilities is provided in Appendix A. Figure 5 shows the locations of those
hazmat facilities in Lancaster County. Areas around these facilities were deemed more
dangerous due to the possibility of incidents during loading and unloading of hazmat.

Figure 5 Hazmat Facilities in Lancaster County
Across the county, facilities storing different hazmats were mostly located along
major arterials and avoided densely populated areas. Figure 6 shows the locations of
hazmat facilities and housing units in the center of Lancaster County. It is notable that
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none of the hazmat facilities are included in areas that have more than 180 housing units.
However, some areas near the hazmat facilities have moderate number of housing units.

Figure 6 Locations of Hazmat Facilities and Housing Units

3.4

Fire Stations, Medical Facilities and Schools in Lancaster County
For risk analysis, the locations of fire stations, medical facilities, and schools were

taken into consideration. It was assumed that areas closer to fire stations would have
lower risk than areas farther from the stations because of greater response time to
hazardous materials incidents. An area in close proximity to a fire station will have a
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lower hazmat risk due to quicker response. Similarly, nearby medical facilities could
reduce the consequences of harmful spilled contaminants due to quick treatment for
patients. However, areas close to schools were regarded to be riskier since people are
more concentrated in schools and young students are more likely to be vulnerable to the
harmful substances than adults. Figure 7 shows the locations of fire stations, medical
facilities, and schools in Lancaster County.

Figure 7 Locations of Fire Stations, medical facilities and Schools in Lancaster County
(Fire Stations in circles, medical facilities in triangles and schools in rectangles)

3.5

Heavy Vehicle Accident Data
Analyzing historic vehicle accident data provides information about where the

potential accidents could occur. If frequent accidents have occurred in a certain area then
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it needs to be investigated for potential future accidents. For this research, accident data
were utilized to identify risk-prone roadway segments for hazmat truck accidents. The
dataset was obtained from NDOR and covered a four-year (2008 to 2011) period. The
data included information on the geographic coordinates of each accident, severity levels,
time of day, weather conditions, etc. Usually, vehicles transporting hazmat are largesized trucks. Therefore, only accidents involving trucks were considered in the
assessment of potential for hazmat accidents. During the four-year period, there were
7,748 accidents involving trucks in Nebraska of which 947 were reported in Lancaster
County. The data were used to predict sites where accident risk was high by analyzing a
point density map. Figure 8 shows the 947 truck accident points in Lancaster County.

Figure 8 Truck Accident Points in Lancaster County (2008-2011)
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3.6

Lancaster County Population Data
It was noted that hazmat accidents in populated areas will do more harm compared to

less populated areas. This is because the total risk from hazmat movement is the product
of the number of shipments, the probability of a release accident for a single shipment,
and the total number of persons that may be affected by a release accident. The
population data were obtained in the TIGER/Line Shapefiles from the United States
Census Bureau. This dataset includes the population and housing unit count by census
block from the 2010 Census for 50 states and the District of Columbia. Figure 9 shows
the 2010 housing units in Lancaster County, Nebraska. The red colors represent a higher
number of housing units and have higher risk of damage in case of hazmat accidents.

Figure 9 Housing Units in Lancaster County (2010)
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4

DATA ANALYSIS
The data analysis followed the three steps shown in Figure 10. First, a spatial

statistical analysis for historical truck accident data was undertaken. Accident data during
the four-year period were used to find their spatial distribution in the study area, and an
accident density map was obtained. Second, a GIS technique called suitability analysis
was conducted to solve a multi-criteria problem. During this step, the geographic areas
that satisfied different criteria were identified and considered as vulnerable areas. The
identified areas were used to designate risk-prone routes in the study area. Third, the
Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) model was used to estimate the
affected area and population by a potential hazmat truck accident on the identified
vulnerable routes.

Step 1

• Analyze the Accident Data
(Spatial Statistical Analysis)

Step 2

• Identify the Vulnerable Routes
(Multi-criteria Analysis)

Step 3

• Estimate the Affected Areas
(ALOHA Model)

Figure 10 Steps in Data Analysis
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4.1

Truck Accident Data Analysis

4.1.1

General description

Truck accident data were utilized to predict routes with potential for hazmat
accidents in the study area. Analyzing spatial patterns of accidents provides information
on where the accidents could be concentrated. If the distribution of accident points in a
certain area is significantly different from the pattern of the same number of randomly
distributed points, the point pattern may suggest clusters or dispersions, and clusters of
accidents could indicate risk-prone roadway segments for truck traffic.
In traditional spatial statistical approaches for a planar area, the null hypothesis is
complete spatial randomness (CSR). Its rejection represents that the points are either
clustered or regularly dispersed. However, since traffic accidents are concentrated along
roads, the traditional CSR hypothesis is invariably rejected. Therefore, a simple cluster
analysis is not practical with respect to traffic accident point data. However, accident
points can be dealt with their properties, or attribute values. In terms of the accident data
obtained from NDOR, each accident contained information on injury severity levels. This
severity level is measured on six different levels. Table 6 represents the description of
each severity level. For instance, if high severity accidents are found to be clustered in a
certain area, the location would be considered as a high severity accident-prone area. If
low severity accidents are gathered together in another area, that can be regarded as a low
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severity accident-prone area. Using the attribute values of accidents, clusters having high
or low severity accidents were identified.
In the original accident data, severity levels were classified as FATAL, INJ-A, INJB, INJ-C, PDO and N-R (not reported). For each severity level, corresponding values in
numbers were added because the spatial analysis uses attribute values in numbers. That
is, FATAL accidents have the highest number (6), and the number goes down as the
severity level reduces. With these attribute values, the spatial analytic concepts of Global
Moran’s I, Getis-Ord Gi* statistic, and Kernel Density were used to discover where the
high or low severity accidents were clustered and how dense those accidents points were
in the study area.
Table 6 Accident Severity Levels
Type
FATAL

Description

Value

Fatal crashes

6

INJ-A

Severe injury crashes

5

INJ-B

Moderate injury crashes

4

INJ-C

Minor injury crashes

3

PDO
N-R

Property damage only crashes
(Damage crashes of $1,000 or more)
Non-reportable
(Damages less than $1,000)

2
1
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4.1.2

Global Moran’s I

Global Moran’s I is a spatial autocorrelation tool to identify if the spatial pattern of
attribute values in the study area is clustered, dispersed, or random (Moran, 1950). As the
name suggests, Global Moran’s I searches for spatial patterns of feature values for the
whole study area. It is unable to pinpoint where the high or low attribute values are
clustered locally. Instead, it only provides whether the whole study area is clustered with
high attribute values and/or low attribute values with statistical significance. The
technique produces the Moran’s I Index value to show the results. Also, z-score and pvalue are determined to show the significance of the calculated index. The index and the
z-score can be computed by the following equations:

I=

∑𝑛𝑖=1 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 (𝑥𝑖 − 𝑋̅)(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑋̅)
𝑛
×
∑𝑛𝑖=1 ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖,𝑗
∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑋̅)2

𝑧 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =

𝐼 − 𝐸[𝐼]
√𝑉[𝐼]

Where, xi is an attribute value of a target point, xj is an attribute value of a
neighboring point, wij is the spatial weight between point i and j for example, as wij = 1
if i ≠ j and the two points are within the specified distance, and by wij = 0 otherwise, n
is the total number of points.
The expected value and the variance of Moran’s I are given in the following
equations:

33

𝐸[𝐼] = −1/(𝑛 − 1)
𝑉[𝐼] = 𝐸[𝐼 2 ] − 𝐸[𝐼]2
The ranges of Moran’s I index are between -1 and 1. A positive value represents
distribution of high and/or low attribute values that are clustered in proximity, while
negative value indicates the distribution of high and low attribute values that are
dispersed compared to the random distribution. A zero value implies no spatial
autocorrelation amongst the points, representing the distribution of attribute values are
randomly distributed.
When it comes to statistical hypothesis in Moran’s I, the null hypothesis is that the
attribute values for each point are randomly distributed among the points without
changing the location of the points. If the p-value is not statistically significant, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, concluding that the study area has randomly distributed
attribute values. If the p-value is statistically significant, the sign of the z-score
determines whether high and low attribute values are clustered or dispersed. A positive zscore means the study area has high and/or low attribute values aggregated, while a
negative z-score represents that high and/or low attribute values are dispersed.
In this research, straight line distances among accident points were considered to
define clusters, and a fixed distance band was used for the spatial conceptualization. To
be specific, if a certain fixed distance is set, GIS calculates the target point with its
neighboring points within that threshold distance. The points beyond the distance are
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excluded from calculations. The Global Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation tool was used to
identify proper critical distance to calculate neighboring points used in the hot spot
analysis. That is, it helps discern a critical distance, which makes the spatial
autocorrelation stronger. This is because using different critical distances produces
different z-scores and if an analysis with a certain distance produced the peaked z-score
in the series of Global Moran’s I analysis, the selected distance is the search scale radius,
which makes the spatial clustering the strongest.
By changing the distance, multiple trials of Moran’s I were conducted using an
incremental spatial autocorrelation tool. This measures how the degree of spatial
autocorrelation changes as the distance changes using Global Moran’s I, and the degree
can be measured by z-score. The initial distance was set to 328.08 feet (100 meters), and
the increment was 164.04 feet (50 meters). A total of 30 distance bands (100m ~ 1550m)
were tested to find the peaked z-score. Figure 11 shows the z-scores at different distances
for truck accident points in Lancaster County. The detailed information about the result
of Incremental Spatial Autocorrelation in 30 different distance bands is provided in
Appendix B. The peaked z-score is highest at the distance of 1,804.46 feet (550 meters)
for the critical distance. The z-score and p-value were 2.804 and 0.00504 respectively.
Thus 1804.46 feet (550 meters) was used in the hot spot analysis for the search radius to
define neighboring points.
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Figure 11 Spatial Autocorrelation by Distance for Truck Accidents in Lancaster County

4.1.3

Hot Spot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi* Statistic)

The hot spot analysis was used to find clusters with high or low feature values with
statistical significance. Hot spots refer to clusters with high attribute values while a cold
spot represents clusters consisting of low feature values. For each target point, the
analysis searches adjacent points within the critical distance band. Afterwards, the
analysis determines whether the target point is surrounded by high or low feature values
with statistically significant levels. Instead of global spatial statistics such as Global
Moran’s I, the hot spot analysis uses the Getis-Ord Gi* Statistic, which is a local
variation measure of spatial clustering. That is, the analysis can help pinpoint those
clusters. If a target point containing a high attribute value is surrounded by enough
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neighboring points with high attribute values, the point is determined to be a statistically
significant hot spot. In this research, a hot spot analysis was conducted to find where the
high and low severity accidents were clustered. The clustering locations could be
considered high or low severity accident-prone areas.
The calculation of the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic is given as the following equation. The
Gi* statistic itself is the z-score. If the z-score is not statistically significant, the target
point is surrounded by high and low feature values together, resulting in no clustering of
high or low feature values. When the z-score of a target point is statistically significant, it
can either be clusters of high or low values. A positive z-score means high feature values
are clustered (hot spots), while a negative z-score represents low feature values clusters
(cold spots). In terms of the size of z-score, a larger z-score indicates a higher degree of
clustering while a smaller z-score implies a lower degree of clustering.
∑𝑛 𝑥𝑗
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑤𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗 − ( 𝑗=1 ) × ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛

𝐺𝑖 ∗ =

𝑛
2
2
∑𝑛
∑𝑛
∑𝑛
√ 𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗 − 𝑗=1 𝑥𝑗 × √𝑛 𝑗=1 𝑤𝑖𝑗 − (∑𝑗=1 𝑤𝑖𝑗 )
𝑛
𝑛−1

2

Where, xi is an attribute value of a target point, xj is an attribute value of a
neighboring point, wij is the spatial weight between point i and j for example, as wij = 1
if i ≠ j and the two points are within the specified distance, and by wij = 0 otherwise, n
is the total number of points.
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Hot spot analysis was conducted in GIS with the truck accident data. The specified
critical distance band was set at 550m (1804.46 feet), which made spatial autocorrelation
stronger. That is, the spatial weight (wij ) was equal to zero beyond that distance since the
fixed distance method was chosen in the analysis. Figure 12 shows the result of Hot Spot
Analysis.

Figure 12 Hot Spot Analysis for Truck Accidents in Lancaster County
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The result of the hot spot analysis showed the points with statistically significant
levels. In the downtown area of Lancaster County substantial cold spots, or clusters of
low severity accidents, were detected. Figure 13 shows the clusters of low severity
accidents near the downtown area. Most of the cold spots were at the intersection of West
O Street and 9th Street. Even though many accidents occurred at that location, the
severity level for the cluster was somewhat mild since the area has a complex road
network, making traffic move slowly. Several hot spot clusters were identified across the
study area. Hot spots tended to be located on high speed roadways such as interstate
highways or major highways. Also, they were usually near intersecting or merging points
of more than two roadway segments.

Figure 13 Clustering of Low Severity Accidents
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4.1.4

Accident Density

To consider the clustered truck accident points objectively in the analysis, a density
map for each point was produced. In GIS, the Kernel Density tool estimates a magnitude
per unit area from accident points using the Kernel function. This creates smooth contour
lines from the center in which a point exists to the reference location. With other points,
the density map can be created with smoothly curved surfaces for each truck accident
point.
Instead of applying accidents equally to get an accident density map, a different
weight for each accident was applied in terms of the results of the hot spot analysis. The
hot spot analysis produced z-scores on the accidents to decide which belonged to a hot
spot or cold spot with confidence levels. Thus, a different weight was applied to each
accident using its respective z-score. For instance, accidents with z-scores greater than
2.54 were given the highest weight (7) since the points were regarded as hot spots at a
99% confidence level. Accidents with z-scores larger than 1.96 and smaller than 2.54
were given the second highest weight (6) since the points were identified as hot spots at a
95% confidence level. In a similar manner, hot spot accidents with a 90% confidence
level were weighed at 5. Statistically not significant accidents, meaning they are not in
hot spots or cold spots, were designated as 4 in weight. Cold spot accidents with a 90%
confidence level were assigned a 3 in weight since the chance of having high severity
clustered accidents is lowered as the confidence level increases in cold spots. Thus,
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accidents having 95% and 99% levels of confidence for cold spots became 2 and 1 for the
weight respectively. Table 7 shows the accident weight classifications in terms of zscores and confidence levels. GIS calculates the point density map using the weights
specified with z-scores in the Hot Spot Analysis. That is, the point density is formed with
the number of points as well as the weight of each point. The weight here is z-scores and
confidence levels. The higher the possibility of being a hot spot, the heavier the weight is
for each accident point.
Table 7 Accident Weigh Classifications
Class

Hot Spot

Insignificant

Cold Spot

Z-score range

Confidence level

Weights

z ≥ 2.54

99%

7

1.96 ≤ z < 2.54

95%

6

1.645 ≤ z < 1.96

90%

5

-1.645 < z < 1.645

Not Significant

4

-1.96 < z ≤ -1.645

90%

3

-2.54 < z ≤ -1.96

95%

2

z ≤ -2.54

99%

1

Figure 14 shows the Kernel Density map in the center of Lancaster County. The
search radius for Kernel Density was set to 1804.46 feet (550 meters) because the
distance was found in the multiple trials of Global Moran’s I to be the maximum spatial
autocorrelation among points. Smoothly tapered surface areas were developed to each
point and the density value of the surface areas decreases when the distance increases
from the point. In the density map, the identified hot spots were appropriately reflected
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by considering z-scores as weights. Despite the significant number of low severity
accidents clustered in the downtown area, the map with weights produced a balanced
density map by focusing more on hot spots, or aggregated severe truck accidents. This
was because the density map used not only the number of points, but also the weights for
the z-scores.

Figure 14 Kernel Density Map in the Center of Lancaster County
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4.2

Multi-criteria Analysis
Compared to selecting a risk-prone area with only one criterion, analyses considering

diverse criteria may produce a more accurate and reliable result. In this research, several
different layers, such as AADT; wind speed; the locations of hazmat facilities, fire
stations, medical facilities and schools; heavy vehicle accident density; and population
density were integrated and scrutinized to locate areas most susceptible to a hazmat
accident.
In order for the different input layers to be integrated into one result layer, all the
input layers were converted into raster format. That is, each layer was defined as a space
where equally-sized cells are posed in a grid structure form of rows and columns. Figure
15 shows a common 10 × 10 raster structure.

Figure 15 Raster Data Structure
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Since each cell in a raster has its own value, more than two raster datasets can be
combined by adding, averaging, or using other techniques for these values, creating a
resulting raster form where the values in the cells are arranged according to the operation
used on the integrated layers. However, when considering more than two layers together,
the numbering system from input layers may be different. For instance, in this research,
the wind speed map had a numbering system for speed (m/s or ft/s) while the population
density was measured using housing units (number of houses). The range value for each
different input raster layer must be identical, which can be achieved by reclassifying each
raster datum. Once the range values for different layers are comparable, the layers can be
combined by adding or averaging the cells based on geographic overlap. Figure 16 shows
the simple averaging combination process of two different layers. By averaging the
values in the cells, the most suitable area in terms of different criteria can be detected.

Figure 16 Averaging two Different Layers

When joining different raster datasets, it may be that one raster data is deemed more
important than another. That is, input layers may be considered with different risk
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significance. For instance, in this research, roadway segments that have higher AADT
should be considered more vulnerable than those having lower AADT. Thus, different
weighting schemes should be applied for different raster layers. Figure 17 shows an
example applied with weights (30 percent for layer A and 70 percent for layer B). In such
a case, layer B is considered more significant and the resulting layer shows different
arrangement of cell values compared to the one in Figure 16.

Figure 17 Combining Two Different Layers with Weighing

Using the weighted overlay function in ArcGIS, different datasets can be integrated
with weighted values. The system indicates the calculated cell values in a different color
scheme to show where high or low values are for appropriateness of a given study area.
The technique was considered useful to deal with multi-criteria problems. In this
research, different properties of the diverse data obtained to identify vulnerable areas in
terms of a potential hazmat truck accident were investigated with this technique. Figure
18 represents the flowchart of the multi-criteria analysis.
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Data
Preparation

Environment
Setting

Deriving
Datasets

Reclassifying
Datasets

•Collecting Required Data
•Formatting Data

•Selecting a proper projection
•Setting a processing boundary
•Deriving distance from the road network according to AADT
•Deriving distance from the schools, fire stations, Hazmat and medical facilities
•Deriving proper values from Wind power class Truck accident density and Population Density map

•Assigning identically classified range values to datasets
(Assigning 1 to 30: 30 to the most vulnerable places and 1 to the least vulnerable places)

•Weighted overlaying all the inputs with given percentage
Weighted
Overlaying

Figure 18 Flowchart of Multi-Criteria Analysis

4.2.1

Data Preparation

The data were obtained from diverse sources and explained in section 5.1. The raw
data of the locations for fire stations, medical facilities, hazmat facilities, and schools
were available in an Excel spread sheet containing information on coordinates of those
facilities. These facilities were geocoded and created in the Shapefile format in GIS with
visual representations on a map. The road network was classified into three different
groups representing different AADT (0~15,000; 15,001~30,000; and 30,001 or more).
This is because AADT was considered an indicator of the degree of potential danger for
hazmat truck accidents. Thus, the three roadway groups with different AADT were
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loaded in three layers. Also, wind speed, population, and truck accident density layers
were added in GIS. The truck accident density layer was the output of accident data
analysis explained in the section 4.1. Finally, all the layers were clipped to fit to the
Lancaster County area only. That is, in using the Lancaster County layer, all the areas
beyond the County boundary were excluded in this analysis.

4.2.2

Environment Setting

Before the analysis, a map projection and a calculation processing extent needed to
be set in ArcGIS. The map projection transforms the curved surface of Earth to a flat
surface. In the course of this process, some distortion is inevitable since the flat surface
cannot perfectly mirror the spherical surfaces of Earth. There are many projections
available that have their own mathematical transformation processes to convert the
Earth’s surface into a map on a flat piece of paper by preserving information such as
distance, area, or direction. This research used the Equidistant Conic method, which is a
projection method by which distances among features along the meridians are preserved
proportionately. Application of the Equidistant Conic projection method helped produce
more appropriate results since this research was mostly based on the distances among and
from point data. Also, an output processing extent was also set that allowed calculation
processes in ArcGIS to continue until the set boundaries were reached. The analysis
boundary was defined to be the study area as Lancaster County.
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4.2.3

Deriving Raster Datasets

The feature class datasets such as polygon, line, or point must be converted into the
raster datasets in multi-criteria analysis. The data for the location of fire stations, schools,
hazmat facilities, and medical centers were converted into the raster data format using the
Euclidean distance tool. This calculates distances from the features and assigns
corresponding values to the cells in a raster data form. For example, when the locations
of hazmat facilities were considered, the raster cell values decrease as the distance from
each facility increases in straight lines. In a similar way, line feature class datasets for
roadway groups with different AADT were converted into the raster data form. The
distance was calculated from each line feature and cell values were arranged with the
distance.
The polygon feature class datasets, such as population density and wind speed class,
already had assigned values in each polygon feature across the map. Thus, these datasets
were converted into the cell-based raster format by maintaining the values. Since a cell
may include more than one polygon feature value, it is required to manage how the cells
will be assigned with multiple feature values included in one cell. Three different
methods exist to determine polygon values in a cell-based raster format. The first method
is to use the cell center with which GIS assigns a value in a cell for the raster form by
considering where the center of the cell is located. If the center meets with a certain
polygon feature value, the value becomes the cell value. The second method is to use the
maximum area included in a specified cell. In a cell, the biggest polygon area and its
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value represent the cell. The last method is to use the maximum combined area where cell
values are determined with the combined majority polygon features within the cells. This
method is distinguished from the maximum area method because it determines one
majority area by aggregating homogeneous fragmented polygons within a cell. Figure 19
shows the illustration of how the cell value is determined with multiple polygon feature
values assigned in one cell.

Figure 19 Illustration of an assigned value in a cell in raster datasets

With the datasets used in this analysis, all three methods produced a fairly similar
result. This is because the specified cell size in this research was significantly small and
this small cell size formed a considerably detailed resolution across the study area. Thus,
the result of three were the almost same and the cell center method and its result map
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were used for the analysis. Meanwhile, the truck accident density map obtained in the
accident data analysis was originally produced in a raster data format. Thus, it did not
require the transformation and was used directly. Figure 20 shows all the derived raster
datasets.

Figure 20 Derived Datasets
(1: Roadway segment AADT (0 to 15000), 2: Roadway segment AADT (15001 to
30000), 3: Roadway segment AADT (30001 or more), 4: Medical Facilities, 5: Fire
Stations, 6: Schools, 7: Hazmat facilities, 8: Population Density (Housing Units), 9: Wind
Speed Class Map, 10: Truck Accident Density)
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4.2.4

Reclassifying Datasets

To integrate different raster datasets into a single dataset, all the input rasters needed
to be set in a common range scale. Since the datasets derived from the previous step had
their own values in different measurement units, all the input datasets were reclassified
from 1 being the least vulnerable to 30 being the most vulnerable in terms of hazmat
release accidents on roads. That is, the surfaces on input raster datasets were equally
divided into 30 different segments. Each segment represents a different risk level. Figure
21 shows the reclassified datasets.

Figure 21 Reclassified Datasets
(1: Roadway segment AADT (0 to 15000), 2: Roadway segment AADT (15001 to
30000), 3: Roadway segment AADT (30001 or more), 4: Medical Facilities, 5: Fire
Stations, 6: School, 7: Hazmat facilities, 8: Population Density (Housing Units), 9: Wind
Speed Class Map, 10: Truck Accident Density)
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4.2.5

Weighting and Combining

To obtain the integrated result raster layer, the reclassified datasets were overlaid in
GIS to find the most vulnerable place. When combining the datasets, it is realistic to
assign a different weight to each raster dataset according to the relative importance of the
layer. In this analysis, equal weights were assigned except for the roadway groups that
had different AADT. Table 8 shows the weighting scheme applied for this analysis.
Table 8: Percentages of Influence for Each Raster Datum
Raster Datasets

Roadways

Influence (%)

AADT(0 to 15,000)

5

AADT(15,000 to 30,000)

10

AADT(30,000 or more)

15

Hazmat Facilities

10

Medical Centers

10

Fire Stations

10

Schools

10

Wind Speed

10

Truck Accident Density

10

Housing Unit

10

Except in the case of roadway groups, 10% of weight was used for all other raster
datasets. In this analysis, the weighting scheme applying different weights on the
different raster layers was not used due to the lack of information and literatures which
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specify relative importance among different raster layers. Instead, this research more
focused on developing procedures to be applied later with different analysts who use their
own local factors determining relative importance of input layers. All things considered,
the final result map is shown in Figure 22. The darker shaded areas were more vulnerable
to hazmat accidents.

Figure 22 Integrated Result Raster Layer for Hazmat Truck Accidents
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4.2.6

Identifying Risk-Prone Roadway Segments

The integrated result map from multi-criteria analysis was used to identify risk-prone
routes in Lancaster County. The weighted value range was between 9 and 20, and the top
two tiers (19 and 20) were considered to be the first prioritized risky areas with respect to
hazmat truck accidents. Figure 23 shows the highlighted top two tiers. That is, if the
routes are near those highlighted yellow areas, they are considered high-risk with respect
to the hazmat truck accidents.

Figure 23 Highlighted Top Two Tiers in MCA
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A 300-ft wide buffer was created for each highlighted area to select nearby riskprone routes. The buffers for these areas also combined tiny fragmented roadway
segments in reasonable length. Figure 24 shows the selected routes. The routes were
overlapped with the risk-prone areas.

Figure 24 Identified Vulnerable Routes in Lancaster County
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4.3

Impact Analysis
With the identified vulnerable roadway segments, impact analysis was conducted to

estimate the affected areas and quantify the population vulnerable to potential hazmat
truck accidents. The analysis was explained with a theoretical scenario where a truck
trailer carrying chlorine had overturned on a risk-prone route identified by the multicriteria analysis. Using hazmat release pattern modeling software called Areal Locations
of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA), diffusing patterns of hazamt from the accident
point were portrayed. With the specified disperse patterns and distances of the hazmat
release, generalized affected areas were estimated, and housing units within the identified
patterns were considered as affected population.

4.3.1

Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA)

ALOHA is computer software that models hazardous material release patterns. It
was developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
the US EPA, and is distributed by the National Safety Council (NSC). This program has
been used as an emergency response tool for hazmat release accidents because it can
predict the air dispersion of toxic materials. Once several factors about the hazmat
accident are determined, the program delineates atmospheric conditions from toxic
source materials based on the user-specified Level of Concern (LOC). LOC in this
research is a critical level of toxicity set to create different threat zones. The software
allows setting three LOCs and estimates threat zone boundaries accordingly. Emergency
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Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) were used for the toxic LOCs for chlorine, so the
three defined LOCs were 20 ppm, 3 ppm and 1 ppm, respectively, in chemical
concentration. That means the program calculated the different toxic zone boundaries
according to the chemical concentration value.
The derived atmospheric patterns for hazmat release were utilized to estimate and
quantify the affected areas and population in Lancaster County. Figure 25 shows an
example of the model estimation for a chlorine release accident with three different threat
zones based on the specified levels of toxicity. The smallest ellipse is the zone where the
chemical is highly concentrated. Larger ellipses indicated lower concentrations of
toxicity levels due to wind dispersal. The software considers statistical uncertainties
about wind direction. The areas drawn with lines beyond the shaded areas are probable
threat zones at a 95% confidence level according to wind direction uncertainty. This
means that the model results have a range of variability. As an example scenario with
several assumptions, a plausible hazmat release pattern is estimated in the following
section.
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Figure 25 ALOHA Model Prediction in Lancaster County with Three different Threat
Zones

4.3.2

A Virtual Scenario for ALOHA Modeling

A virtual scenario for a hazmat release accident was used to model an example case,
and it reads as follows: On July 19, 2014, at 10:03 a.m. local time, a truck trailer carrying
chlorine was overturned on the Interstate Highway 80 near Superior Street in Lancaster
County. The truck had a horizontal cylinder tank whose diameter was 4 feet and length
was 36 feet. It included 3,046 gallons of chlorine liquid (90% of a full tank). When trying
to avoid a sedan changing lanes, the truck overturned and the tank developed a hole
resulting in about 17% of the liquid chlorine leaking on to the paved roadway and
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gasified into surroundings. The leak was about a 2-inch circular hole, situated 3.3 feet
from the concrete bottom. The outside temperature at the site was 75°F, and the wind
speed was 6.15 miles per hour (measured at 160.04 feet from the ground) from northwest.
It was partly cloudy and about 75% humidity. The terrain on the site was open without
any buildings.
To model the hazmat release accident, several input data were required in the
program including crash site data, chemical data, atmospheric conditions, and chemical
source data. First, the information on the location, date, time, and surrounding
environment of the accident point were input. Second, the chemical type was chosen
from the provided library function in the program. Third, atmospheric conditions such as
wind speed and direction, air temperature, cloud cover, and humidity were selected.
Finally, chemical source information on tank size, tank types, stored chemical
temperature, and types of leaking were included. Table 9 shows the input data for
ALOHA modeling.
Table 9 ALOHA Model Input Data
Description
Site-specific data
Chemical data

Input types
Location
Time
Chemical name
Wind

Atmospheric
conditions

Ground roughness
Cloud cover
Air temperature

Input
Lincoln, Nebraska
July 19, 2014, at 10:03 a.m. local time
Chlorine
6.15 miles per hour from NW at 164.04
feet
Open country
Partly cloudy
75°F
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Chemical source

Relative humidity
Tank diameter
Tank length
Liquid volume
State of the
chemical
Stored temperature
Opening type
Released quantity

75%
4 feet
36 feet
3,046 gallons (90% of full tank)
Liquid inside the tank/Gas outside
-30°F
Circular opening with 2 inch diameter
17% of 3,046 gallons

Figure 26 shows the estimated footprints, or toxic threat zones, for the hazmat release
accident according to ERPG (20ppm, 3ppm, and 1ppm for chlorine). To be specific, the
smallest areas within the red line had a chlorine concentration greater than 20 ppm. The
next larger areas within the yellow line had a chlorine concentration greater than 3 ppm
but less than 20 ppm. Finally, the areas within the black line represented a chemical
concentration greater than 1 ppm but less than 3 ppm. The detailed ALOHA result
summary table can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 26 ALOHA Modeling for Virtual Scenario
To estimate the affected areas, the footprint was loaded in GIS using ALOHA’s
ArcMap import tool with appropriate coordinates. The affected areas for the chlorine
release accident were portrayed from the accident spot in Lancaster County as shown in
Figure 27. The calculated threat zone distances for the three chemical concentration
levels were 0.9, 1.9, and 2.8 miles respectively.
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Figure 27 Chlorine Release Accident Dispersion Pattern in Lancaster County

4.3.3

Estimation of Affected Area

One of the common methods to estimate the affected area is to use a band of fixed
width on a link. Calculating the number of people residing inside of the area produces the
link consequence. The main assumption of this method is that people living inside of the
band will be impacted equally and no one outside of the band will be impacted. However,
it does not consider wind speed and direction of chemical dispersion. One circle cannot
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mirror different impact levels, which are based on the concentration level of toxic
substances. Also, when the wind is blowing, chemical substances move and affect areas
further downwind while upwind areas have less or no impact. That is, an impact analysis
with circular areas may produce erroneous prediction results. Therefore, it is important to
differentiate the consequences at different distances by applying concentration levels.
Using ALOHA software, it was possible to use a dispersion model to estimate the
concentration levels at different distances from a pollution source. It predicted three
different threat zones from the most concentrated chemical area to the least concentrated
area, considering the site specific data, chemical information, atmospheric conditions,
source data, and other important characteristics.
To quantify the area, the estimated model in ALOHA was projected onto an aerial
photo in ArcGIS, and the actual affected areas within the dispersion model were
considered as affected areas. Since the model included statistical uncertainty about wind
direction, both actual affected areas and total possible affected areas at a 95% confidence
level were calculated. Table 10 shows the areas measured in acres. Dispersion of
chemical on larger area resulted in reduced chemical concentration. However, the
affected area size increased drastically as the chemical concentration attenuated from the
source point.
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Table 10 Measured Areas for Chlorine Dispersion Accident
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) for
Chlorine Concentration
Statistical Occurrence
ERPG-3 (20 ppm)
Actual Affected Areas
(Shaded areas)
Total Possible Affected
Areas at 95%
Confidence (Dashed
areas)
Note: the unit of area is the acre.

4.3.4

ERPG-2 (3 ppm)

ERPG-1 (1 ppm)

127.27

446.95

900.39

562.72

2295.48

4935.67

Estimation of Affected Population

From the possible hazmat release plumes portrayed in GIS, people affected by the
accident were estimated using 2010 population data for Lancaster County. The data were
obtained from the US Census Bureau and included population and housing units by
census block groups. All of the block groups within the identified hazmat release plumes
were considered, and the number of people and the housing units within the blocks were
counted to estimate the affected population. When selecting affected blocks, blocks
within the boundaries for hazmat plumes were included. However, for the blocks that
were partially included within the boundary lines, a logical way was required to decide
whether the block should be included. Since the population data were recorded by
polygon-shaped census blocks while the hazmat release boundaries were curved lines,
these two different shapes inevitably caused erroneous results when estimating the
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affected population. Thus, in this research the centroid concept was used to decide
whether the block should be counted or not. If the block centroid was inside the cutoff
line, it was included for the calculation of the affected population. This method was used
because selecting block groups only within the boundary lines resulted in significant
underestimation of the affected population. In other words, block groups whose areas
were mostly included in the hazmat release boundaries would have been excluded if the
centroid method had not been used. Even though this method overestimated the affected
population, it was not as significant as the problem of underestimation when only
considering blocks that were totally included. Table 11 presents the affected populations
in different chlorine concentration levels. Since patterns of hazmat release accidents were
fan-shaped, the affected populations increased as the distance from the source increased.
Table 11 Affected Populations in Different Chlorine Concentration Levels

Affected populations

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) for
Chlorine Concentration
ERPG-3: 20 ppm

Number of People
Housing Units

ERPG-2: 3 ppm

ERPG-1: 1 ppm

1,355 (4,267)

3,181 (15,015)

4,475 (24,509)

659 (1,934)

1,525 (6,281)

1,998 (8,569)

Note: The numbers in parenthesis represent total possible affected population at a 95%
confidence level about wind variability.
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5

DISCUSSION
Through the research work, the proposed methods found solutions about problems of

the previous research work. Many researchers have tried to conduct operation research
for hazmat transportation problems to provide optimized routes. However, most of them
gave much attention to local routing problems in the given network. Even, the operation
research did only consider limited factors such as travel time or cost in multi-criteria
analysis. The raster analysis technique proposed in this thesis allows considering
numerous factors together in cell-based raster formats. This area-based identification tool
can also be applicable to broad areas.
In the previous research, hazmat transport prediction models were mostly applied for
a single mode of transportation. Even though some researches had investigated hazmat
routing methods to apply for all transportation modes, the procedures became complex
and included intricate equations. In this proposed GIS-based hazmat transportation risk
identification method, different modes of transportation such as rail, pipeline or even
water transportation could be easily integrated and analyzed together within a specified
study area due to the map-based GIS integration techniques.
The proposed methods developed an effective tool to deal with hazmat transportation
route risk assessment. However, the analysis process also leaves some possible
limitations behind to be dealt. When weighting and combining different raster layers in
the multi-criteria analysis process, some factors may not change the results while others
may change the result significantly due to their different sensitivity to the result. For
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instance, it is probable that the locations of fire stations or schools may not be
significantly influential to the result because they are evenly spaced across the study area.
On the other hand, locations of hazmat facilities would affect the result more since they
are likely to be located in a certain area for safety purposes. Thus, establishing a
sophisticated weighting scheme is required to produce a more accurate result.
In addition, input layers identified for inclusion in the analysis could be based on
some objective indices such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
requirements. In this research, eight possible different datasets were considered, but there
may be some other variables which can also be included. A list of critical facilities
provided by U.S. Department of Health Human Services (DHHS) could be used to find
all possible variables being included for the analysis.
Finally, in the hot spot analysis, the straight lines among accident points were used to
calculate the spatial relationship. However, it is more accurate to use network-based lines
since the accident points are inter-related along the roadway network. In addition, these
straight lines do not consider the 3-Dimenssional features such as interchanges, bridges,
or tunnels. Since the accident points were geocoded with only x and y coordinates, the
third factor, or height could be used to identify the spatial relationship among accidents
more accurately.
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6

CONCLUSIONS
Modern industrial processes require hazardous materials and their transportation

across highways carries a certain amount of risk to those living in relative proximity of
those highways. Assessment of routes that pose the highest risk from transportation of
hazardous materials is needed for more informed planning and response. There have been
studies dealing with identifying optimized hazmat routes and estimation of affected areas
using diverse models. However, the direct identification of vulnerable areas with respect
to hazmat releases from truck accidents has not been fully researched. In addition, a
simplified combination of quantitative risk analysis using historical accident data and the
multi-criteria analysis has not been fully exploited.
In this research three main analyses were conducted. First, historical truck accident
data were analyzed with spatial statistical concepts. Instead of creating accident density
maps directly, a spatial data analytical technique called hot spot analysis using the GetisOrd Gi* statistic was used to determine where the high or low severity accidents were
clustered. The accident density map reflected the accident severity levels. That is, high
severity accidents were weighted more based on density. The density map provided not
only where the accidents were clustered but also where the high or low severity accidents
were clustered. The locations of the clusters were considered to be more vulnerable areas
in terms of hazmat transportation. This density map then became one of the inputs for
multi-criteria analysis where diverse criteria were transformed into raster layers. Through
the analysis, it was found that the high severity accidents were more clustered near the
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intersections and interchanges on major highways while low severity accidents were
clustered in downtown area where the roadway network is complex with low speed limits.
Second, all the inputs to identify vulnerable areas were analyzed in GIS through
multi-criteria analysis. The raster analysis technique using small cells was used to discern
cell-based vulnerable areas in terms of hazmat transportation release accidents. By all the
cell values in the input raster datasets, the integrated result raster provided vulnerable
areas in Lancaster County. These areas were then used to select the potential risky routes
for the potential hazmat truck accidents. That is the routes that were overlapped with the
identified vulnerable areas were found and designated to be potential risky routes in
terms of hazmat truck accidents. This area-based identification tool for potential riskprone routes for hazmat release accidents also allows analysts to consider multimodal
hazmat transportation.
Finally, impact analysis identified hazmat release patterns and their consequences by
calculating the affected areas and population. In this analysis chlorine was used for the
calculation of the release pattern in a theoretical accident. ALOHA modeling software for
hazmat was used to produce the hazmat footprint via a virtual scenario. When compared
to the previous methodology using a simple circle to estimate the affected area and
population, the proposed method using ALOHA effectively quantified the more
reasonable affected areas and vulnerable population by considering wind, terrain and
chemical source information. The result created three different hazmat concentration
zones according to Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG). Also, possible
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variation zones with statistical uncertainty for wind direction at a 95% confidence level
were also estimated. The created different distances can be used for the hazmat
evacuation distance planning by quantifying the affected population and areas.
Even though the presented procedure in this research provides an effective tool to
identify the potential risky roadway segments and the affected areas and population for
hazmat evacuation plans, there are future research topics to be explored. The applied
weights for each criterion layer in the multi-criteria analysis may be modified for
different regions where the analysis is conducted. Thus, a universal application process to
apply the concept to other areas could be researched henceforward. That is, the weight for
each input datum could be area-based to accurately mirror reality by creating local factors.
Also, the input system for real-time data should be deployed to establish an immediate
evacuation planning tool. In particular, integration of the input system for varying traffic
and weather conditions would provide real-time evacuation planning process to local
governments when hazmat truck incident occur in the area.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) in Lancaster County

Facility Name

Address

Zip

Latitude

Longitude

LINCOLN ELECTRIC SYSTEM
TERRY BUNDY GENERATING
STATION

7707 BLUFF RD

68517

40.9097

-96.6128

PARKER HANNIFIN CORP

252 N 134TH ST

68520

40.814167

-96.538333

KAWASAKI MOTORS
MANUFACTURING CORP USA

6600 NW 27TH ST

68524

40.877992

-96.758428

NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER
DISTRICT SHELDON STATION

4500 W PELLA RD

68368

40.55202

-96.7829

LAND O'LAKES PURINA FEED LLC
- LINCOLN

5500 N COTNER
BLVD

68507

40.868222

-96.618468

TELEDYNE ISCO A BUSINESS UNIT
OF TELEDYNE INSTRUMENTS INC

4700 SUPERIOR ST

68504

40.857354

-96.655028

VEYANCE TECHNOLOGIES INC

4021 N 56TH ST

68504

40.853264

-96.644184

MOLEX INC

700 KINGBIRD RD

68521

40.852101

-96.738394

LESTER ELECTRICAL

625 W A ST

68522

40.799069

-96.728859

LINCOLN INDUSTRIES INC

600 W E ST

68522

40.803125

-96.728391

ADM

7800 THAYER ST

68507

40.866447

-96.620111
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PFIZER INC

601 W
CORNHUSKER
HWY

68521

40.835588

-96.728228

SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA

1717 CENTERPARK
RD

68512

40.765942

-96.697879

TRI-CON INDUSTRIES LTD

4000 NW 44TH ST

68524

40.854167

-96.781111

ADM MILLING

540 S ST

68502

40.791582

-96.714309

CLEAVER-BROOKS INC

6940
CORNHUSKER
HWY

68507

40.869427

-96.626847

YANKEE HILL BRICK
MANUFACTURING CO

3705 S
CODDINGTON
AVE

68522

40.777

-96.7495

BEDIENT PIPE ORGAN CO

1060 SALTILLIO
RD

68430

40.697222

-96.705278

MOLEX INC

1400 W BOND CIR

68521

40.844323

-96.740403

STANLEY SENIOR TECHNOLOGIES

1620 N 20TH CIR

68503

40.829167

-96.691944

FARMLAND FOODS INC (COOK'S
HAM)

200 S 2ND ST

68508

40.8125

-96.7169
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Appendix B Result of Incremental Spatial Autocorrelation in 30 different distance bands

OBJECTID

Distance(m)

Distance(feet)

MoransI

ExpectedI

Variance

z_score

p_value

1

100

328.084

0.011177

-0.002061856

0.000739

0.487011

0.62625

2

150

492.126

0.01562

-0.001733102

0.000778

0.622033

0.53392

3

200

656.168

0.02531

-0.001618123

0.000741

0.989382

0.322476

4

250

820.21

0.033482

-0.001485884

0.000745

1.281044

0.200178

5

300

984.252

0.018936

-0.00140056

0.000705

0.765929

0.443719

6

350

1148.294

0.053556

-0.001328021

0.000702

2.071437

0.038318

7

400

1312.336

0.057057

-0.001270648

0.000668

2.257363

0.023985

8

450

1476.378

0.063886

-0.001240695

0.000618

2.618806

0.008824

9

500

1640.42

0.060688

-0.001216545

0.000567

2.599235

0.009343

10

550

1804.462

0.062848

-0.001201923

0.000522

2.804334

0.005042

11

600

1968.504

0.056293

-0.001180638

0.000496

2.579562

0.009893

12

650

2132.546

0.051912

-0.001173709

0.000449

2.506454

0.012195

13

700

2296.588

0.052179

-0.00116144

0.000411

2.632039

0.008487

14

750

2460.63

0.045733

-0.001152074

0.000382

2.399401

0.016422

15

800

2624.672

0.042579

-0.001146789

0.000349

2.340353

0.019266

16

850

2788.714

0.035722

-0.001142857

0.000317

2.071476

0.038314

17

900

2952.756

0.029185

-0.001141553

0.000287

1.789503

0.073534

18

950

3116.798

0.024577

-0.001140251

0.000266

1.576795

0.114843

19

1000

3280.84

0.019808

-0.001136364

0.000254

1.313059

0.189163

20

1050

3444.882

0.020209

-0.001135074

0.00023

1.406692

0.159519

21

1100

3608.924

0.016898

-0.001135074

0.000216

1.225808

0.220271

22

1150

3772.966

0.016212

-0.001133787

0.000205

1.210382

0.226133

23

1200

3937.008

0.012177

-0.001132503

0.000196

0.951204

0.341501

24

1250

4101.05

0.016614

-0.001128668

0.00019

1.285979

0.19845

25

1300

4265.092

0.014729

-0.001128668

0.000182

1.175892

0.239638

26

1350

4429.134

0.016648

-0.001127396

0.000173

1.351216

0.176626

27

1400

4593.176

0.014115

-0.001126126

0.000165

1.185792

0.235705

28

1450

4757.218

0.016186

-0.001126126

0.000155

1.389855

0.164573

29

1500

4921.26

0.01774

-0.001124859

0.000149

1.543679

0.122666

30

1550

5085.302

0.018386

-0.001124859

0.000142

1.636035

0.101832
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Appendix C ALOHA Text Summary
SITE DATA:
Location: LINCOLN, NEBRASKA
Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.47 (user specified)
Time: July 19, 2014 1003 hours CDT (user specified)
CHEMICAL DATA:
Chemical Name: CHLORINE
Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol
AEGL-1 (60 min): 0.5 ppm AEGL-2 (60 min): 2 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 20 ppm
IDLH: 10 ppm
Ambient Boiling Point: -30.9?F
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm
Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%
ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
Wind: 6.15 miles/hour from NW at 164.04 feet
Ground Roughness: open country
Cloud Cover: 5 tenths
Air Temperature: 75?F
Stability Class: B
No Inversion Height
Relative Humidity: 75%
SOURCE STRENGTH:
Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank
Non-flammable chemical is escaping from tank
Tank Diameter: 4 feet
Tank Length: 36 feet
Tank Volume: 3,384 gallons
Tank contains liquid
Internal Temperature: -30?F
Chemical Mass in Tank: 39,642 pounds
Tank is 90% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 2 inches
Opening is 40 inches from tank bottom
Release Duration: 16 minutes
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 569 pounds/min
(Averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 1,321 pounds
Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow).
THREAT ZONE:
Model Run: Heavy Gas
Red : 1599 yards --- (20 ppm = ERPG-3)
Orange: 1.9 miles --- (3 ppm = ERPG-2)
Yellow: 2.8 miles --- (1 ppm = ERPG-1)
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